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Thomas Sheehan has made the "atheological" charge that "Chris-
tianity's original sin is to think it is about God," but there is a dif-
ferent lesson to take if attention is paid to the metaphoric dimension 
of the ways Aquinas, Rahner, Heidegger and even Sheehan himself 
think and speak about God. If there is an original fault from which 
Christianity must be saved, it has as much to do with the conception 
of what is happening when Christianity thinks and speaks, as it does 
with the conception of what this speaking and thinking is about. 
"Christianity's original sin is to think it is about God."1 That is 
what Thomas Sheehan charges in "From Divinity to Infinity," a pro-
vocative article which merits scrutiny because it articulates a funda-
mental theological challenge of our day.2 The reputation of Sheehan's 
scholarship and success in engaging a broader public give reason to 
take his indictment seriously. He is a recognized authority on Heideg-
ger's philosophy and advocate most recently for a paradigm shift in that 
field.3 His study of the philosophical roots of Karl Rahner's theology is 
1
 "From Divinity to Infinity," in The Once and Future Jesus, The Jesus Seminar 
(Santa Rosa, CA: Polebridge Press, 2000), 27-44, at 28; a paper originally presented in 
1999 at a conference sponsored by the Jesus Seminar. 
2Sheehan is a Professor of Religious Studies at Stanford University and Professor 
Emeritus in the Department of Philosophy at Loyola University, Chicago. An extensive 
bibliography of his work is available at: http://www.stanford.edu/dept/relstud/faculty/ 
sheehan/Sheehan.html. 
3
 "A Paradigm Shift in Heidegger Research," Continental Philosophy Review 32/2 
(2001): 1-20; see also: "Geschichtlichkeit/Ereignis/Kehre," Existentia (Meletai Sophias) 
[Budapest] 11/3-4 (2001): 241-51; "Nihilism and Its Discontents," in Heidegger and Prac-
tical Philosophy, ed. David Pettigrew and François Raffoul (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 2002), 275-300; "Das Gewesen," in From Phenomenology to Thought, 
Errance, and Desire, éd. Babette Bablich (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1995), 157-77; and for a 
particularly accessible overview of Sheehan's Heidegger: "Heidegger, Martin (1889-
1976)," Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward Craig (New York: RouÜedge, 
1998), IV: 307-23. 
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rigorously argued and penetrating.4 His book on the historical Jesus and 
the origins of Christianity reflects the thinking and influence of the 
Jesus Seminar and, like his essays in the New York Review of Books 
over the years, has found a significant and receptive popular audience.5 
A second reason for examining the article closely is that it raises 
questions which trouble people about the idea of a transcendent God 
and about the relevance of Jesus' message to our time and place. Shee-
han makes a forceful philosophical case for a "radical social human-
ism" that, while affirming the experience of transcendence, is con-
vinced this bespeaks not God but merely the endless open-endedness 
and mystery of human existence. Experience itself and reflection upon 
it do not get us to God. Nor in Sheehan's reading of the historical 
origins of Christianity is it necessary to postulate that Jesus' radical and 
liberating stance entailed getting a religious or metaphysical "fix" on 
God. This contradicts what Jesus stood for and constitutes Christiani-
ty's original sin. For Sheehan fidelity to Jesus is possible without the 
God he constantly oriented himself to. Failure to address explicitly and 
convincingly arguments such as these, as Anthony Godzieba has ob-
served, is contributing to a "progressive eclipse" of much post-Vatican 
II Catholic theology.6 
A third and most important reason for examining the article cited 
in note 1 is to clarify what is going on when "Christianity thinks it is 
about God." Sheehan concludes his article professing that it was some-
thing of a "sermon"—"nothing more than a very idiosyncratic enact-
ment of one set of presuppositions"— and that his intention was "not 
to convince anyone to share these presuppositions but to suggest that 
each of us has some such story, a proto-anthropology and a proto-
theology, mostly unthematized, which guides his or her interpretation 
of Jesus' message."7 
4Karl Rahner: The Philosophical Foundations (Athens: Ohio University Press, 
1987). For reasons that will be elaborated here, however, I do not share his conclusion 
that Rahner's thought in the end carries too much theological baggage. 
5
 The First Coming: How the Kingdom of God Became Chnstianity (New York: 
Random House, 1986; paperback edition: New York: Vintage, 1988) now available on-
line at: http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/thomas_sheehan/firstcoming/ 
index.shtml. The bibliography cited in note 2 above includes his many essays in the New 
York Review of Books. 
6Anthony J. Godzieba, "Incarnation, Theory, and Catholic Bodies: What Should 
Post-Postmodern Catholic Theology Look Like," unpublished manuscript of his presen-
tation in the Constructive Theology and Contemporary Theory Group, Catholic Theo-
logical Society of America (Cincinnati), June 6, 2003. 
7
"From Divinity to Infinity," 43.1 share this conviction that each of us has a set of 
presuppositions that guide our interpretations and that will influence future appropria-
tions of Jesus' message. Sheehan's essay itself, read with his other writings in mind, 
provides a compelling case study for this thesis because the article discloses the degree 
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There is, however, another deeper logic, or grammar, entailed in 
the "telling" of stories to which Sheehan's analysis does not attend. 
One has to get the genre right—the logic right—to get a story's point and 
its interpretive implications. Sheehan, with Heidegger's help, and 
sometimes with Rahner's, Aquinas's or Jesus', is very good at indicating 
something about "what" Christianity is not "intending" when it thinks 
and speaks of God. As Sheehan puts it provocatively, Christianity is not 
about "a transcendent God"—that is to say, not about the onto-theo-
logical God of metaphysical speculation. Sheehan is not so successful, 
however, at indicating what believers are doing, or about what he him-
self is doing, when they, or he, "think" and "speak" of God. Curiously, 
he, like Heidegger, continues to speak of God. His rationale for saving 
the concept of God, however, is not clear. 
My aim in this article is to suggest that there is a different lesson 
that one might take from the ways Heidegger, Aquinas, Rahner and 
perhaps even Sheehan himself think and speak about God. If there is an 
original fault from which Christianity must be saved, it has as much to 
do with the conception of what is happening when Christianity thinks 
and speaks, as it does with the conception of what this thinking and 
speaking is about. Sheehan's article raises fundamental "questions 
about how presuppositions work and what they can do."8 My reason 
for "saving" God has to do with more basic questions about how think-
ing, speaking and naming work and what they can do. 
I. A Train Ride 
"At the risk of being corny," Sheehan's sermon asks us to imagine 
ourselves on "a train ride."9 The first leg covers what he calls finite or 
radical infinity, which he distinguishes from perfect infinity. Perfect 
infinity, for Sheehan, is the kind that we imagine God having. 
God.. .has everything together: he knows everything, controls every-
thing, and has endless power.... As perfectly self-identical or coin-
cident with himself—as Aristotle put it, an act of thinking that thinks 
of nothing other than of itself as an act of thinking: noesis noeseos— 
God already has everything.10 
We humans on the other hand are finite. But our radical finitude entails 
a kind of infinity too. Unlike God, we do not have everything together. 
We "must search and question and learn endlessly, that is to say, infi-
to which his understanding of Heidegger's thought influences his account of Rahner's 





nitely."11 And, Sheehan adds, "these efforts are never over and done 
with. Like a mathematical infinity, you can always add one more on to 
the series, and one more again, endlessly, or at least until death."12 This 
"radical humanism" entails an incompleteness. Human being is pro-
jected beyond itself into a future that never arrives. Sheehan notes that 
this has implications which will be unacceptable for many Christians. 
The only sin is to refuse to be the mortal, finite, and thus endlessly 
self-transcending infinity that we are. In principle there is nothing 
we cannot know and manage endlessly (and in principle com-
pletely), unbounded by divine restraints. There is no way in which 
God's perfect infinity could ever function as a brake on our finite 
infinity—and this is not some hybristic defiance of God's creative 
power but the very gift of that power.13 
As a solicitous conductor, Sheehan recommends that those "who insist 
on putting an in-principle limit upon the human.. .mortal but infinite 
Odyssey of intellect and will" might want to disembark at the next 
station.14 So too, all "who think God has to be the final restraint on our 
finite infinity, that he is the wall we eventually will hit."15 He admon-
ishes those passengers to take their baggage with them. But he adds 
somewhat enigmatically that "those who believe in creation might 
want to stay on board" for awhile, since "that doctrine is precisely the 
tracks on which [Sheehan's] train is running."16 
T. S. Eliot Express 
On the next leg of the trip, Sheehan raises the question about our 
ultimate destination. Here he parts company with all those who "be-
lieve that the correlate of our finite infinity is the hidden God who 
stands beyond the horizon, drawing us onwards towards himself."17 
Sheehan's scenario has these passengers departing at track two on the 
T. S. Eliot Express. 
If you transfer to the T. S. Eliot Express you will soon notice that the 
people on that train have a tremendous advantage over us. Over there 
they believe that the correlate of our finite infinity is the hidden God 
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self. The passengers over there are able to have it both ways. They get 
history now and eternity later; they operate on faith during the jour-
ney but attain to the vision of God once they pull into the final 
station. Most importantly they know that their train, while being 
governed to some extent by the secondary causality of nature, sci-
ence, and technology (Newton's laws of motion, diesel power, and so 
forth), is ultimately being pulled to its final destination not by the 
secondary causality of the locomotive up front but by the final cau-
sality of God up ahead.18 
This "up-ahead" model of God as our "correlate" has no place in Shee-
han's vision of things. He is convinced that "all we can affirm phenom-
enologically, i.e., experientially is this: Every step we take forward is 
answered by the horizon moving a step backward."19 Our endlessness 
bespeaks not God or our movement toward God but only the endless 
open-endedness of our self-transcendence. He grants that we may ap-
propriately call this "receding horizon a mystery, but it is the mystery 
of ourselves as finite infinity. What the receding horizon makes avail-
able to us is our world; and what constitutes the receding of the horizon 
is our own finitude—not God, or God's drawing power, or our alleged 
progressive itinerary toward God."20 But just at this moment, when it 
sounds as though Sheehan has no place at all for talk of God, he ex-
plains, "To say this is not to deny that God exists but to deny that the 
'up-ahead' model is an adequate way to speak of God." Nor, he adds, is 
it a matter of the people on his track being "undecided whether the 
correlate of our movement is God or the endless humanization of the 
world."21 For while he holds that "the goal we are moving towards is 
not God but more of our finitely infinite selves," he again protests, "To 
say this is not to deny that God exists..." but only to deny that forcing 
a choice between God or humanization of the world "is a responsible 
way to think about God's relation to us."22 In fact, Sheehan's argument 
at Ulis point is quite paradoxical. He emphasizes, "In the final analysis 
our endlessness bespeaks not God but our present mortality and our 
future death," but he also argues that since this "endless lack" at the 
heart of our transcendence reflects the "very laws of our creation," "it 
is out of a deep sense of piety in the divine creator that we should 









Despite such enigmatic caveats about God's existence and the doc-
trine of creation, Sheehan anticipates that most passengers will transfer 
at this point to the T. S. Eliot Express. While acknowledging the allure 
of the Express—"the train of the God-up-ahead, drawing us onwards as 
he recedes into mystery"—Sheehan advances three reasons for not 
jumping on board. 
First, people on the Express according to Sheehan have "gotten it 
all wrong about the directionality of human vision."24 "Over there," he 
warns, "they promise us an illusory metaphysical glimpse into the 
Beyond as a supplement to our ordinary vision of this world— 
something that Aquinas has showed [sic] to be impossible."25 That is 
why Sheehan thinks Aquinas would not be transferring to the other 
train. 
He argues conclusively that we human beings have only one legiti-
mate line of vision, the view that our senses have of this world of 
physical data, which we make sense of by means of our spiritual 
faculties. According to Aquinas we cannot look over and beyond 
sense data—cannot, as it were, stick our heads out the train window 
and peer up ahead into the metaphysical future, catch a glimpse of 
God waiting for us at the final station—and then return, assured and 
comforted, to our seats and to our normal vision of the world.26 
Sheehan's second reason for not switching to the other track is that the 
people on the Express misconstrue its destination. 
Not only is it true that the horizon keeps receding, but we can never 
peer beyond it. And least of all should we ever attempt a leap of faith 
over it—because we would only land in nothing. The horizon is 
something like the expanding universe that keeps offering us more 
worlds to explore; but we cannot reach ahead and touch some "mem-
brane" that defines the edge of the universe of experience, much less 
cut through it and penetrate to the other side—because there is no 
such "membrane" and there is no "other side," only more and more 
of this side.27 
What we find on this side is not God but more of ourselves, our worlds, 
and our lives. But the most important reason for avoiding the Express, 
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what he thinks is the nature of this danger, however, is a bit difficult. 
The surface argument is clear enough. Sheehan notes that since we are 
intrinsically social, the open-endedness of our finite infinity is more 
properly conceived as an endless co-openness. Sheehan's "radical hu-
manism" entails a "radically social humanism." Our open-endedness is 
dependent upon and interrelated to everyone else's. If, as he has ar-
gued, the correlate of our endless openness is not some transcendent 
"other" who is out there, but rather the ever receding possibilities of 
our human self-transcendence, then the correlate turns out to be the 
ever receding possibilities of the whole human species' self-transcen-
dence. 
This is why it is dangerous for those who are riding the T. S. Eliot 
Express to call the correlate of human becoming "God." For if one 
does choose to use the word "God" to name the open-ended correlate 
of human openness, then "God" would be a name for the perhaps 
asymptotic but nonetheless immanent fulfillment of the whole hu-
man species across history. The word "God" would be a marker for 
the full unfolding of all the natural and social powers of humankind. 
Then we really would be in bed with David Strauss, along with 
Hegel, Feuerbach, and Marx, and wouldn't that be fun... .29 
Feuerbach-Strauss Une? 
But what about Sheehan's own train? Does it also follow the tracks 
that Feuerbach laid in the 1840s? That is how John Caputo reads him,30 
and the last two lines of the quotation plus the concluding ellipsis 
could be taken as confirmation of that interpretation. On such a read-
ing, the Eliot Express is dangerous because believers will discover that 
somehow they have ended up in the sleeper car not only with Feuer-
bach and his friends but, for Caputo, with Sheehan himself. It is clear 
why from a believer's perspective that would be considered a danger 
and why Sheehan might jest about this leading to some fun. But there 
are difficulties with that reading. 
First, at the beginning of the article, Sheehan criticizes Strauss's 
program to retrieve the "latent truth" of Christianity for not going far 
enough. It is not clear that Sheehan himself wants to be in bed with 
Strauss, Feuerbach and company. Sheehan's thesis, "that Christianity's 
29Ibid., 40; the ellipsis is Sheehan's. 
30John Caputo, "Undecidability and the Empty Tomb: Toward a Hermeneutics of 
Belief," in his More Radical Hermeneutics: On Not Knowing Who We Are (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2000), 225, a revision of an earlier essay: "Radical Hermeneu-
tics and Religious Truth: The Case of Sheehan and Schillebeeckx," in Phenomenology of 
the Truth Proper to Religion, ed. Daniel Guerrière (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1990), 146-72. 
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original sin is to think it is about God," is presented as today's neces-
sarily more radical diagnosis.31 The rhetoric suggests, at least, that 
Sheehan thinks his argument is on a different track, not merely a con-
tinuation or extension of an earlier line. 
Second, I noted previously that Sheehan twice protests that his 
analysis does not argue against God's existence—or at least does not do 
so at the points cited. Although he clearly is arguing that the metaphy-
sician's God-up-ahead is not the horizon we experience phenomeno-
logically, there are numerous places where he continues to evoke a 
notion of God which seems more than simply Feuerbach's cipher for 
the human species as a whole: for example, when he avows that the 
"endlessness" of human transcendence "is not some hubristic defiance 
of God's creative power but the very gift of that power."32 This and a 
number of other references in the article to God may be simply rhetori-
cal tropes. But if Sheehan, like Feuerbach, merely is reducing theology 
to anthropology, then why make disingenuous appeals to the notion of 
God? 
A third difficulty in reading Sheehan's comments as an endorse-
ment of the Strauss-Feuerbach line is the thought-experiment with 
which he concludes the article. 
Now a thought-experiment: What if, while still declining to ride the 
Eliot Express, we nonetheless chose to call the correlate of our social 
co-open-endedness by the name "God"?33 
If calling the correlate of our social co-open-endedness God simply 
reiterates Feuerbach's reduction of theology to anthropology, then why 
does Sheehan present this as a new experiment. He knows his philoso-
phy too well. That hypothesis has already been worked over many 
times. But if his is not the Feuerbach-Strauss line, then he means to say 
that the Eliot Express is dangerous because its passengers will end up 
in bed with Strauss and Feuerbach but not with Sheehanl But how then 
is his line different from theirs? And what is the danger that lies in the 
tracks of both the Eliot line and the Strauss-Feuerbach line, but not 
Sheehan's? I do have some guesses about this, but before entertaining 
these, it will be helpful as a first step to examine the three thoughts 
entailed in Sheehan's experiment more closely, looking for indications 
of how it might differ from Feuerbach's hypothesis. 
The similarities are hard to miss. Sheehan's "first thought" is remi-
niscent of Feuerbach's insistence that his primary goal was construc-
tive: to promote the good of humanity against the dehumanizing cul-
31See "From Divinity to Infinity," 29. 
32Ibid., 35. 
33Ibid., 40. 
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turai and religious forces of the nineteenth century.34 Sheehan argues 
likewise that in our situation it is the suffering and hardship of human-
kind that calls for our love, care, reassurance, respect and attention. 
Moreover, humans deserve this "for their own sake, not as a second-
order reflux from another's love of God, and not as a mere stepping 
stone towards some higher good."35 
Sheehan's "second thought" asks us to imagine what would result 
if God did something quite unexpected. "What if God, without reserve 
and without expectation of return, were to lend his name as a stand-in 
for, and a protection of, the intrinsic and unending fulfillment of the 
human community? What if God allowed his name to be used for the 
open-ended correlate of our socially co-open infinity?"36 The move is a 
reverse image of Feuerbach's, but still appears essentially the same. 
Instead of asserting that God is our projection of our humanity, Shee-
han suggests we imagine the initiative on God's part. Is the result dif-
ferent? In both cases "God" designates—in Sheehan's formulation— 
"the asymptotic unfolding of our social powers precisely as immanent 
natural powers."37 Moreover, in both hypotheses the word "God" ulti-
mately serves to protect humanity "against the ever encroaching forces 
of dehumanization" that in our day "seek to reduce us to something 
less than our full social freedom, to make us into (for example) mere 
consumers, or bean-counters, or 'profit-maximizing animals,' or the 
like."38 Like Feuerbach, Sheehan's rationale for "saving the name of 
God" is that we thus will be "saving ourselves."39 The effect on the 
concept of God in at least some respects also seems identical. With his 
thought experiment, "we would also have finally lost the God up ahead 
and up above, the Supreme Being who, even after the Incarnation, 
continues to rule history from beyond history, who reveals himself to 
us from his supernatural heaven, and then draws us as he drew his only 
begotten Son, onwards, upwards, and outwards to our transcendent 
fulfillment."40 But Sheehan at the same time seeks to distance himself 
from the Feuerbach line, insisting this move is not a declaration "out of 
pride or hubris, that we have outgrown our need of the traditional God" 
or that we "no longer find him useful."41 Instead, Sheehan—appealing 
to very explicit theological categories—explains that in his thought 
34Karl Barth, citing Feuerbach's conclusion to the 1848 Heidelberg lectures, notes 
this emphasis in "An Introductory Essay," The Essence ofChrìstianity, trans. George Eliot 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1957), xi. 
35








experiment "the very meaning of 'God' would have revealed itself to be 
kenosis, a self-emptying self-communicating God poured out without 
remainder, not clinging to the form of a transcendent divinity but emp-
tying himself into the form of finite infinity, happily dying as transcen-
dent in order to be reborn in the endless mortal struggle to live our 
co-openness in common, to endlessly enhance each other, to humanize 
nature and naturalize the human—not for any transcendent divine mo-
tive but for no other reason than itself."42 
Sheehan continues, exploring the implications of his thought ex-
periment for other key notions in the Christian scheme, reinterpreting 
"every category and attribute of 'God' as a marker of our infinite co-
openness," just as Feuerbach had reinterpreted Christianity's theologi-
cal doctrines anthropologically.43 He warns that his reading might 
mean the "end of transcendence" and the "end" of "God." Still, he 
promises prophetically: 
But what a labor this would be... to take the highest name for God— 
the Holy, the Blessed One—and read it instead as "making holy, 
making blessed"—in a word, "anointing"—such that the title mes-
siah or christos, "the anointed and blessed," would become an on-
tological designation of our finite infinity, and such that the doing of 
justice and mercy would become (to use the name the early Chris-
tians used for their way of living) the holy and blessed Way.44 
But would Jesus keep a seat on Sheehan's imaginary train? Or 
would he jump to track two and catch the T. S. Eliot Express? Sheehan 
admits that he cannot speak for Jesus and that to pose the question 
about how Jesus would respond might "seem foolish and trivial, per-
haps even offensive."45 Sheehan, however, clearly thinks that sticking 
to his own "idiosyncratic" course is what fidelity to Jesus, experience, 
and self requires. That, he contends, is "not foolish or trivial (though it 
may turn out to be offensive)."46 So what would any of this have to do 
with the historical Jesus? 
Imagine that only half of what we know of the Jesus of history were 
true: common table fellowship, overturning the dominant social hi-
erarchy, consorting with outcasts, challenging the empire and the 
religious establishment. Then postulate that Jesus somehow found 
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forgives our sins, and promises to realize his heavenly kingdom on 
earth. On that premise, can you imagine Jesus giving it up, throwing 
it all over, eating only with the rich, joining the conservative estab-
lishment, reaffirming the old hierarchies, kissing the wrist of Rome? 
Did Jesus' message of the kingdom stand or fall with his faith in the 
transcendent God?47 
There can be no doubting Sheehan's answer to the rhetorical questions. 
Jesus' radical and liberating stance does not require religious and meta-
physical attempts to get a fix on God. Peter's Easter experience arose 
from the valid insight that Jesus' presence was not necessary for the 
enactment of what he preached. Peter's mistake was the further iden-
tification of Jesus with the Kingdom. The emergence of a new religion 
which claims to have a fix on God contradicts what Jesus stood for and 
this constitutes Christianity's original sin. 
This brings us back to the question: how is this "line", or at least 
the bottom line, different from Feuerbach's? Can Sheehan's thought 
experiment and appeals to the notion of God be anything more than 
rhetorical tropes—disingenuous ones, at that? I find nothing in his talk 
for the Jesus Seminar or in his book on Jesus which directly or persua-
sively settles the question. As he notes, the former is little more than an 
outline of some presuppositions and the latter their enactment. To get 
a better understanding of how his presuppositions work, the declared 
objective of his essay, it is necessary to look at their more nuanced 
formulations in his interpretations of Heidegger and Rahner. There we 
can find some indications for making a surmise about why he thinks 
his position is not merely a continuation of the Feuerbach-Strauss line. 
We also will find there that the manner in which Sheehan himself 
speaks and thinks about these matters suggests the possibility of a third 
line which his imaginary account overlooks. I will argue that the plat-
form for this third track is where we will find Aquinas, Rahner and 
much of Christianity disembarking to follow Jesus. 
IL Philosophical Baggage 
The guiding theme of Sheehan's monograph, Karl Rahner, is much 
the same as the essay we have been discussing. Although the book 
traces the philosophical foundations of Geist in Welt [Spirit in the 
World), placing Rahner's scholarly achievement is not its ultimate ob-
jective.48 The concern is again anthropology and the focal question is 
about the reach of human transcendence. Sheehan sees two alterna-
t ic i . 
48Karl Rahner, Geist in Welt, 1st ed. (Innsbruck: Rauch, 1939); 2nd ed. expanded and 
reworked by Johannes B. Metz (Munich: Kösel, 1957). Corrected translation by William 
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tives: For Rahner, man is about God; for Heidegger, man is about 
alëtheia*9 Sheehans issue is the implications of these alternatives for 
us today. That is his motivation for putting Rahner and Heidegger into 
dialogue: "not to find out which thinker is 'better' than the other, but to 
find out what man is about;" not to determine "what a certain theolo-
gian and a certain philosopher have said," but to determine "what we 
might learn from them. We are not asking about Rahner and Heidegger 
but about ourselves."50 Sheehan's expedition through Rahner's philo-
sophical reflections concludes, as his Jesus Seminar paper had, that a 
strictly phenomenological analysis discloses no more than the mystery 
of human open-endedness as such. In addition, however, the dialogue 
between Rahner and Heidegger enables him to explain why the crux of 
this disagreement goes much deeper than the conclusions. The dis-
agreement is rooted in the very questions asked.51 To appreciate the 
difference in the two perspectives, it is essential to see that Sheehan 
and many other Heideggerian scholars are convinced that in asking a 
fundamentally different question, Heidegger transforms the whole con-
text of the discussion and so, likewise, alters the understanding of any 
differences between conclusions. 
Here lies a possible key to understanding why Sheehan may think 
his Heideggerian line follows a different track than Feuerbach's. Feuer-
bach, at least on one reading, still works within the framework of meta-
physical "onto-theo-logy" which presumes that we can get a fix on the 
correlate of our endless co-openness. He answers that the correlate is 
not God but a projection of our own humanity. Such a reduction of 
theology to anthropology, while coming to a different conclusion than 
that of the believer, still presumes that we are positioned to pose and 
answer the question philosophically. It presumes that the horizon of 
human dynamism comes within our grasp. Sheehan's atheological ap-
peal to Heidegger insists that we are neither in such a position nor able 
to get ourselves into one—at least not phenomenologically or philo-
sophically. 
Dych, S.J., Spirìt in the World (New York: Continuum, 1994); CD Version (Milwaukee: 
Marquette University Press, 1994). Hereafter: GW. 
A
*Karl Rahner, 310. 
50Ibid. 
51I argued for the same conclusion but toward a different end and without such 
detailed and insightful analysis in "Rahner and Heidegger: Being, Hearing and God," 
Thomist 37 (1973): 455-88, and in my dissertation "Language, Thinking and God in Karl 
Rahner's Theology of the Word: A Critical Evaluation of Rahner's Perspective on the 
Problem of Religious Language," Fordham University, 1978. 
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Locating Heidegger's Topic 
It is now much clearer than when Rahner studied with him that 
Heidegger's issue, die Sache selbst, is not the question of traditional 
metaphysics. This could almost be taken for granted—except that the 
scandal for Heideggerian-inspired philosophy, as Sheehan himself 
points out, is that both Heidegger and his commentators have had such 
difficulty articulating the all important "difference" from metaphysics 
in language accessible "to those who stand outside the circle of Heideg-
geriane of the strict observance."52 Moreover, although it would seem 
something of a dictum today that Heidegger sought to "overcome" 
metaphysics, it is not clear how well those outside the circle under-
stand what is meant by this. Nor is it clear that many outside the circle 
are convinced he was successful. A few comments here will not resolve 
those problems, but Sheehan's efforts to locate Heidegger's topic by 
indicating five common misunderstandings point us in a helpful di-
rection. 
First, it is a truism but misleading to say that Heidegger's subject 
matter is "being." In the book on Rahner, Sheehan suggests that one 
could make a good case for retiring altogether references to "being" [das 
Sein) and the "question of being" [die Seins frage).53 In a more recent 
essay, he unequivocally argues for dropping the terms.54 The language 
is misleading, in part, because it serves as Heidegger's shorthand for the 
line of questioning that developed throughout his career: "from the 
question of the 'meaning' of being, to the question of the 'truth' of 
being, to the question of the 'place' or 'clearing' of being."55 Heidegger's 
question is not about the "beingness" of beings or about the cause 
which makes them to be, or about the ultimate and highest instance of 
"beingness." Nor is he asking the transcendental question about the 
necessary conditions of possibility for beings or beingness understood 
in those senses. Rather, he is asking what he takes to be a prior question 
about what makes it possible to pose such questions about beings and 
their "beingness" in the first place. He is asking about the prior "clear-
ing" required for such inquiry. His question is about that realm of 
disclosure or "movement which issues in intelligibility"56 in which the 
distinction between beings and beingness is given. 
A second risk for misunderstanding arises from Heidegger's use of 
the term Sein. Sometimes he employs Sein to indicate the matter of 
52Karl Rahner, 281. 
53Ibid. 
54
"A Paradigm Shift in Heidegger Research," 7-8. 
55Karl Rahner, 281. 
56Ibid., 283. 
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concern to him: namely, "the prior disclosive movement which issues 
in the beingness-of-beings."57 But at other times he uses Sein to signify 
the standard concerns of metaphysics with beingness (Seiendheit) in its 
universal traits (ontology) or in its highest instantiation or cause (the-
ology). Heidegger's effort to correct consequent misreadings leads him 
to adopt a number of strategies for clarifying that his question is about 
the prior "event": for example, by emphasizing that his topic is not 
"being" but the "ontological difference," by using the old German word 
das Seyn, by using a cancellation sign in the typing of das Seôï, and 
eventually by dropping the use of the term altogether and speaking 
"instead of the 'meaning' or 'truth' or 'place' of beingness."58 
The third cause of misunderstanding is the reification of Heideg-
ger's topic which "invariably hypostatizes and inflates it into 'Big Be-
ing,' a metaphysical 'Something' (however ethereal) that lies beyond 
entities and that we allegedly 'pursue' and 'relate to'."59 Sheehan criti-
cizes Heidegger himself for lapsing into "ousiological" language that 
gives this impression. And Sheehan laments that among Heideggeriane 
today "'being' has become a ridiculous metaphysical caricature, so 
freighted with confusion and absurdity that it cannot serve as a marker 
for Heidegger's focal topic."60 
In this aggrandized and reified form, Big Being ends up performing a 
host of extraordinary activities (all in the middle voice, we are told): 
it conceals itself and reveals itself, withdraws itself yet dispenses 
epochs of being, calls out to us while abandoning us to technology, 
wraps itself in mystery and yet occasionally pulls aside the veil to 
show Itself to select human beings—nowadays only to paid-up 
Heideggeriane.61 
Sheehan insists that if we hypostasize "being" and chase after it, we 
have lost the sense of Heidegger's question. 
The fourth area of misunderstanding concerns Heidegger's "auda-
cious claim" about the forgottenness of being in the entire history of 
Western philosophy.62 Again, Sheehan emphasizes that Heidegger is 
not claiming that "being" in the usual metaphysical senses of the term 
has been forgotten. Sheehan readily grants the arguments of Thomists 
that "Aquinas raised metaphysical questioning to a new and indeed 




"A Paradigm Shift in Heidegger Research," 7. 
60Ibid. 
61Ibid. 
62Karl Rahner, 285. 
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existential act of to-be, over form and essence."63 But this is still a 
metaphysical questioning after the cause and highest instantiation of 
beingness, not Heidegger's inquiry about the prior "event" or "clearing" 
which makes such thematization possible. Likewise, Sheehan ac­
knowledges that Rahner's effort in Geist in Welt to reground metaphys­
ics brings "onto-theo-logy to its very limits," but his achievement is 
still bound to the language and logic of onto-theo-logy. If Rahner's later 
emphasis on God as mystery moves in Heidegger's direction, Rahner 
never clearly escapes the ousiological conceptuality of the philosoph­
ical traditions upon which he draws. Seinsvergessenheit—Sheehan 
thinks "hiddenness of being" comes closest to Heidegger's meaning— 
does not derive from some alleged deficiency in philosophy or philoso­
phers, or from some psychological or educational deficit, but arises 
from the "intrinsic unknowability" of the "opening up of openness" 
which is Heidegger's topic.64 Sheehan strains in his effort to articulate 
this for those "outside the circle." 
Whereas we do in fact perceive and know entities and their modes of 
givenness, and whereas we immediately experience our transcen­
dence, we do not know, cannot argue to, and (if we stay with our 
experience) cannot postulate any supposed "moving source" of that 
givenness and that transcendence. In fact, it is misleading to speak of 
"the giving of the givenness of entities," as if there were some thing 
or event behind the givenness of entities. Rather, the only thing man 
experiences in that regard is the sheer facticity of the "that-there-is-
given" of the meaningful givenness of entities in conjunction with 
human transcendence.65 
The overlooking or forgetting happens because of the intrinsic reces-
siveness of what his questioning seeks to bring from concealment 
(λήθη). The overcoming of metaphysics, consequently, does not mean 
the overcoming of the sheer facticity of this concealment. Nor could it 
be a matter of doing away, once and for all, with ones own or anyone 
elses overlooking of the hiddenness of beingif only because such over­
looking is due not to a defect in man but to the very nature of being.66 
So what is the truth or bringing from un-concealment (α-λήθ€ΐα) which 
Heidegger seeks. 
Rather, the overcoming of Seinsvergessenheit means, negatively, 
ceasing to overlook the facticity/hiddenness of "being," that is, awak-





ening from the dream of metaphysics, which believes that thinking 
can trace beingness back to God. And positively, the overcoming of 
Seinsvergessenheit does not mean abolishing the facticity/ 
hiddenness of "being" but accepting it, "going along" with it by 
living out one's own (inexplicably evoked) transcendence.67 
Heidegger's Sache selbst on this reading is thus no more and no less 
than what Sheehan referred to in the Jesus Seminar essay as our finite 
infinity, our endless open-endedness, the ever receding possibilities of 
our human self-transcendence. The Sheehan "line" pushes Heidegger's 
thought to its logical conclusion: "Our finitude is die Sache selbst It 
does all the work. No more room for Big Being."68 
This brings us to the fifth area of possible misunderstanding: 
Heidegger's famous "turn" (Kehre). Sheehan argues that there is much 
more to Heidegger's "turn" than a shift in language or style, but it does 
not amount to the emergence of a new topic. Rather it refers to the 
necessity of what Sheehan calls mans turn to lëthë and what Heidegger 
calls the transformation of mans being.69 Human authenticity [Eigent-
lichkeit) consists in being-appropriated into a movement whose term 
cannot be grasped. 
That movement with its unknowable source is what allows men to 
grasp present beings, and the point is to let oneself go beyond beings-
in-their-beingness in the direction of that unknowing. This release 
means that man must "reappropriate his appropriation," but without 
hoping to bring it under control. And this entails letting go of the 
securities of the substantial ego and its tidy world. To do that is to 
have "taken the 'turn'." Heidegger's thought is entirely at the service 
of such a transformation of man's being," and this is the only "turn" 
worth talking about.70 
Moreover, taking this turn is what appears to distinguish Sheehan's 
"line" from Feuerbach's. It is dangerous for those riding the T. S. Eliot 
Express to call the correlate of human becoming "God," because doing 
so fosters the metaphysical illusion that in human transcendence we 
experience some "other" on whom we can get a fix. The believer calls 
the "other" God. Feuerbach reduces the "other" to humanity. Sheehan 
with Heidegger insists that there is no getting beyond "one's own (in-
explicably evoked) transcendence." Experience and philosophical re-
flection upon it do not get us to such an "other." Nor does experience 
67Ibid. 
68
"A Paradigm Shift in Heidegger Research," 17. 
e9Karl Rahner, 289. 
70Ibid. 
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afford an intellectual grasp (intuition or conceptual knowing) of our 
inexplicable movement itself, as Feuerbach might be taken to hold. 
Although there might be similarities at the practical and political level 
between Feuerbach's humanism, a liberal Christian humanism, and 
Sheehan's radical humanism, the underlying visions of reality are 
headed off in very different directions. On this reading, it turns out that 
people on the T. S. Eliot Express and the Feuerbach line are burdened 
with much of the same philosophical baggage and so end up headed off 
together in the wrong direction. Sheehan's atheology, on the other 
hand, calls for a radical surrender to human transcendence which re-
sists any onto-theo-logical attempt to hypostatize either humanity's 
inexplicable dynamism or its horizon. "The movement is governed by 
its own intrinsic recessiveness—a non-hypostasizable 'nothing' that 
always outrides every moment in the movement while, so to speak, 
'pulling' the movement on."71 
III. Theological Baggage 
But then, what about Sheehan's idea that we are likely to find 
Thomas Aquinas and even Jesus on his train? The rationale for his 
suggestion is implicit in his analysis and evaluation of Rahner. In the 
1940 article on Heidegger, Rahner does not appear to appreciate the 
difference between Heidegger's question and his own. He identifies 
Heidegger's problematic with the metaphysical inquiry about being-
ness in general and about God as the highest instance and cause of 
beingness. Rahner's position at this point, however, is not without 
some ambiguity. Sheehan analyzes a misquotation in the article of a 
seminal line from Heidegger's Was ist Metaphysik? which suggests an 
intimation of what Heidegger was after.72 But the intimation at this 
point is at best only tacit. In the major works from this period, Rahner 
not only uses Heidegger's thought "to extort an existential transcen-
dental turn out of Aquinas," he also "uses Aquinas to extort an affir-
mation of God out of Heidegger."73 Sheehan summarizes the essential 
difference between their positions at the time this way. 
71Ibid., 299. 
72Ibid., 114, where Sheehan explains that Heidegger asked "Warum ist überhaupt 
Seiendes und nicht vielmehr Nichts!" which could be translated as "Why are there beings 
at all and not rather Non-being?" Rahner's quotation in French (there is no copy of an 
original in German) asks "Pourquoi y a-t-il de l'être au lieu du pur néant?" (Why is there 
being rather than pure nothingness?) which by conflating Seiendes with Sein, and 
Heidegger's "Nichts" with "pure nothingness" ironically approximates Heidegger's po-
sition. 
73Ibid. The major works of the period, of course, are GWand Hörer des Wortes, first 
edition (Munich: Kösel, 1941), second edition reworked by Johannes B. Metz (Munich: 
Kösel, 1963); Hearer of the Word, translation of the first edition by Joseph Donceel, edited 
by Andrew Talion (New York: Continuum, 1994); CD Version (Milwaukee: Marquette 
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Rahner claims that Heidegger is carrying out a transcendental in-
quiry into the universal and ultimate structure of esse. Heidegger 
claims that he is trying to "locate" esse and all other forms of being-
ness within a larger horizon. Rahner will hold that a transcendental 
turn to the existential structures of human being can reawaken meta-
physics in general and the affirmation of God in particular, i.e., "re-
ground" them on a modernly acceptable "foundation." Heidegger 
claims that to follow out man's existential movement into its appro-
priation by the self-withdrawing, self-hiding mystery [Geheimnis] 
will not ground any ontology or theology, in fact will lead to an 
"abyss" [Abgrund) which, beyond pessimism and optimism, is the 
inexhaustible origin of meaningful presence. Rahner.. .claims that 
one can and indeed must—even if only implicitly—know this "mys-
tery" as the divine. Heidegger will answer with a measured skepti-
Sheehan surmises that Rahner later came to appreciate the difference in 
perspectives, at least to some extent. He observes that from the 'sixties 
there is a "gradual de-emphasis" of earlier references to God "as pure 
and absolute beingness." Rahner's tendency from that time on is to 
speak more of God as "mystery" or "the holy mystery".75 Sheehan 
wonders if one of Rahner's latest works, Foundations of Christian 
Faith, indicates an even more explicit shift away from ousiological 
language about God as das Sein. He cites Rahner's statement: 
We could, of course, follow the venerable tradition of the whole of 
Western philosophy, a tradition to which we are certainly respon-
sible, and simply call it "absolute being" [Sein] or "being in an ab-
solute sense" or the "ground of being" which establishes everything 
in original unity. But when we speak this way of "being" and the 
"ground of being," we run the deadly risk that many contemporaries 
can hear the word "being" only as an empty and subsequent abstrac-
tion from the multiple experience of the individual realities which 
encounter us directly. For this reason we want to try to call the term 
and the source of our transcendence by another name.. . . We want 
to call the terms and source of our transcendence "the holy mys-
tery."76 
Sheehan interprets Rahner here as suggesting "a formal homology be-
tween the Christian God and the 7ëtfïë-dimension of disclosure in 
University Press, 1994). This translation is much more reliable than the earlier one by 
Michael Richards: Hearers of the Word (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969). 74Ibid., 115-16. 
75Ibid., 309. 
76Ibid., quoting Foundations ofChrístian Faith (New York: Seabury, 1978), 60. 
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Heideggers thought.77 Once Rahner understands, as he had not in the 
1940 article on Heidegger, that das Nichts was not pure nothingness but 
rather the withdrawing, self-hiding dimension of the disclosive pro-
cess, Rahner feels "free to adapt Heidegger's thought to his own theo-
logical ends."78 The difficulty, of course, is that Heidegger insists his 
own thought does not demonstrate a transcendence toward God as the 
unnamable mystery. 
Sheehan grants that Rahner has the right to push beyond Heideg-
ger's conclusions, but Sheehan also argues that in doing so "Rahner's 
language falls behind his insights."79 The insight which prompts Spirít 
in the World is the "non-philosophical, non-metaphysical belief in the 
God of Christian faith."80 But, from Sheehan's standpoint, Rahner ar-
ticulates that insight in metaphysical language which is inadequate to 
the task because it already knows the answer it seeks. From the start it 
assumes the identification of the God of Christian faith with Aristotle's 
conception "of the divine as a self-intuiting intuition, a perfect self-
coincidence in a unity of being and self-knowledge."81 Consequently, 
Rahner's transcendental turn is "scored on a hidden premise: that man 
is an intuition manquee/9 that is, on the assumption that the movement 
of our being finds its truth only insofar as it approximates the ideal state 
of God's perfect self-knowledge.82 Given the premise, it is inevitable 
that Rahner will discover in human intellection a co-affirmation of God 
as the pure act of beingness, whereas Heidegger will see only an ever-
recessive anticipation and movement. 
Since Sheehan is convinced by his reading of Heidegger that Rah-
ner's earlier "ousiological" language about God as absolute esse does 
not and cannot provide an adequate conceptualization of the dimen-
sion of mystery disclosed in the movement of the human spirit, he 
concludes that "Rahner's later shift from the language of beingness to 
that of mystery... represents more than a rhetorical strategy; it is rather 
a rending of the ousiological garment, a surrender of its language and 
viewpoint in order to attempt to find words adequate to an insight that 
transcends the metaphysical experience."83 In Sheehan's scenario, 
however, it is not a clear or consistent break. He observes that Rahner 
continues "to speak now and again of 'infinity' and 'infinite actuality'," 
or of God as "a being [Sein) of perfect self-presence [Bei-sich-sein)" 









of faith."84 Sheehan wonders: "Are these the careless slips of a theolo-
gian who is not fully aware of when his philosophy edges beyond 
ousiology and when it falls back into it?"85 He concludes that "Rahner, 
it seems, is simply not concerned with this matter."86 
Atheological Turn 
To Sheehan this "indifference" is both the strength and the danger 
of Rahner's theology. "The strength lies in the insight, which comes 
from outside of philosophy, that man is claimed from beyond himself. 
The danger lies in the fact that Rahner's slips back into the grammar of 
ousiology may end up forfeiting the mysteriousness of the mystery that 
he believes in."87 Sheehan warns: "An adequate language may not 
guarantee an insight, but it can protect it."88 The insight of Rahner's 
that Sheehan contends needs such protection sounds at this point 
nearly identical to Heidegger's: that the whereunto [Wohin) of human 
transcendence "presents itself to us in the mode of withdrawal, of 
silence, of distance, of being always inexpressible, so that speaking of 
it, if it is to make sense, always requires listening to its silence."89 
So despite the slips back into onto-theo-logical language, Sheehan 
sees Rahner's best insights affirming humanity's radical open-
endedness. The essence of our humanity is this movement in ever-
recessive mystery. Sheehan notes that in speaking of this movement 
[Vorgriff), even in the early work, Rahner prefers language which sug-
gests a "going towards [gehen auf) or aiming at [zielen auf)" its hori-
zon.90 So the English translations which suggest that the Vorgriff is a 
pre-apprehension that "attains to God" miss the "brilliance of the revo-
lution he brought about within ousiology and the breakthrough he 
made—partially and tentatively—beyond ousiology."91 While granting 
that Rahner goes beyond Heidegger in claiming to discover here a 
movement toward God, Sheehan nevertheless concludes that "the pur-
pose of Rahner's entire philosophical effort is to show that man has 
only one apprehension—of worldly things—and no prior apprehension 
(pre-apprehension, pre-grasp) of God."92 That, recall, was the same 
thing he said about Aquinas. And this would appear to be the reason 
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and I presume Rahner too—would not join the others switching to the 
T. S. Eliot Express. At their best, Sheehan would have us believe, 
Aquinas and Rahner know with Heidegger that our humanity is about 
alëtheia. God appears precisely by not appearing, for man is the ques-
tion to which there is no answer. The infinite horizon of human ques-
tioning is experienced as one which recedes further and further the 
more answers man can discover'."93 The experience of God, conse-
quently, "is not an intuition, grasp, or apprehension (prior or poste-
rior). It is more a hope than it is a surety or a vision. It is more authen-
tically found in the experience of the insecurity and groundlessness of 
experience than in the supposed sighting of the stable ground that 
holds everything together."94 
Sheehan's "atheological" turn seeks to retrieve that insight and to 
free it from the devolving history in which "faith became a matter of 
theology."95 That happened, according to Sheehan, when the God of 
metaphysics (the stable perfectly self-present and infinite knower, 
known in Greek as theos) was taken over by Christianity. Theology 
came to be construed as the guide to the fulfillment of humanity's 
desire in the contemplative vision of God. "The movement of man's 
desire, the experience of his incompleteness, had its goal set for it: the 
intuition of stable, eternal self-coincidence."96 Sheehan suggests that 
although Rahner himself never traced such a devolution, "his philo-
sophical and theological accomplishment points to an alternative, a 
way of overcoming it." Not surprisingly, that way is the one which we 
have seen Sheehan himself advocate: the return to the experience of the 
movement of our own open-endedness and the surrender to its reces-
siveness as always beyond reach. "Rahner has turned the discourse 
about God (theo-logy) back to a discourse about man (kineo-logy)."97 
Sheehan proposes to carry the retrieval of this "unsaid" insight to its 
logical conclusion. 
A philosophical effort to name the unnamable while leaving meta-
physics behind might conceive of itself as an "atheology." This 
would be a mode of discourse (logos)—or better, a silent attunement 
to one's own movement (logos as kinesis)—that recognizes that the 
theos of traditional metaphysics and Christian theology is hardly 
adequate to the mystery inscribed in that movement. Atheology is a 
refusal of all claims to know already that the world is grounded in 
self-identical cognition. It radically calls into question the ontology 






of coincidence that rules from the noesis noeseos of Aristotle, 
through what Rousselot called "the intellectualism [= intuitionism] 
of St. Thomas," down to the being-as-Bei-sich-sein of Rahner. In 
Heidegger's terms, it would he a kind of thinking that is captured by 
difference rather than identity, by movement rather than stasis.98 
It is noteworthy that Sheehan's atheology offers a critique of Heideg-
geriane too. He thinks that they also "would do well to heed" the return 
to human experience which he "retrieves" from Aquinas and Rahner. 
They too need to overcome the "unfortunate tendency in Heidegger's 
own work, and in the work of his commentators, to hypostasize 'being* 
into an autonomous 'other' separate from entities and from man and 
almost endowed with a life of its own."99 We have seen already that 
Sheehan does not find warrant in Heidegger's phenomenological analy-
sis for expecting any kind of "advent of being" that would issue in a 
"secular beatific vision."100 
Thus Sheehan's atheology finds the best insights of both Rahner 
and some Heideggeriane at odds with their language. The question 
which remains is whether Rahner's central insights are at odds with 
one another. Is humanity about alëtheiai Or is humanity about God? 
How far does Sheehan want to push this disjunction? It is clear that he 
thinks Rahner did not go the whole way. 
Rahners retrieval of the unsaid in Aquinas did not go far enough. 
Rahner recaptured a hidden theme in Aquinas that is finally only a 
transcendentalized Aristotelianism. But Rahner did not go deep 
enough into the pre-philosophical roots of Aristotle (I mean the ar-
chaic Greeks) or into the pre-theological roots of Aquinas (I mean 
Jesus). 101 
If Rahner had taken those further steps, it would "have meant a deci-
sive move out of metaphysics as natural theology" conceived as "the 
rational search for the stable ground of all that is."102 But how far then 
does this overcoming of metaphysics as natural theology go? Certainly 
Sheehan objects to Spirìt in the Worlds argument for "regrounding a 
theological metaphysics on a transcendental-anthropological base, 
even a kinetic base."103 Does saying this—that humanity is about alëth-
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not identical with the "God" of metaphysics? Does it leave room for 
Rahner's notion of God as mystery, the hidden God of faith who always 
recedes from our grasp? Perhaps. Sheehan says that atheology "might 
harbor the possibility of belief."104 He insists, however, that this belief 
could not be "a pre-vision of theós." Rather it must be "a resolute 
commitment, a surrender, to an unceasing exploration that constantly 
returns to where we started: the darkness of interrogative knowing."105 
But then it must be asked, does this "darkness of interrogative know-
ing" leave room for the God of faith? Sheehan is indefinite. On the one 
hand, he says only that atheology might harbor the possibility. On the 
other hand, he urges us beyond the unmasking of Aristotle and Aquinas 
to unmask the experience of Jesus. And this "one last move" leaves us 
according to Sheehan, "for better or worse, with ourselves: the radical 
question that finds no answer." Rahner's early work in Spirít in the 
World carries "too much presupposed, unquestioned baggage for such 
atheology." Sheehan concludes ambiguously that "for those who do not 
carry that baggage, the task of finding out who man is remains open."106 
IV. Alëtheia or God? 
Is our humanity ultimately about alëtheia or about God? Sheehan 
resorts to his image about the train ride, in part, because a short essay 
could hardly unpack all the baggage that would be necessary to get an 
adequate response off to a good start. I face the same limitation. In 
probing his analogy a little further, I merely intend to raise the possi-
bilities of an alternative view and a different set of presuppositions. 
Sheehan said that his concern in the essay was to demonstrate that 
each of us has a set of assumptions that guide our interpretations and 
influence our appropriations of Jesus' message. It is not necessary to 
say much more about that. Sheehan's book on Rahner does not disguise 
how its Heideggerian commitments determine what constitutes the re-
trievable in Christian philosophy and theology, and particularly in 
Aquinas and Rahner. While the essay for the Jesus Seminar does not 
explicitly lay out its presuppositions as Heideggerian, it does candidly 
acknowledge the degree to which they inform Sheehan's hypothesis 
about how the kingdom of God became Christianity. His historical ar-
guments presuppose the philosophical baggage. 
In excursions of the mind, unlike train trips, no one leaves their 
baggage behind. Sheehan himself, of course, is in part making that 





we bring to our understanding of the human journey. The train trip 
analogy, however, does not convey adequately the degree to which our 
baggage actually carries us along on the journey. And trains, busses, 
cars and planes are all part of our baggage. Our use of one vehicle rather 
than another has momentous consequences. It affects the speed of our 
ride, the route, the relative comforts, the impact on the environment, 
and even the destination—some towns are not served by trains; some 
cities have no airports. And how we use and adapt the vehicles may be 
even more consequential. The human being's incredible co-open-
endedness is manifested in the ways these once naked animals coop-
eratively have taken on tools, progressively modifying them in ways 
that open new and amazing possibilities: the sandal, the wheel, the sail, 
the wing, the rocket, not to mention paper, pen, transistor, micro-chip 
and all the attendant conceptual and affective infrastructures. What we 
have done with such baggage effects how we go, where we go, and how 
far we go. It gives us new worlds and new horizons. It changes what 
humans can do and what they can become: from hunter-gatherer to 
space explorer, from shaman to scientist. 
Rather than ask with Sheehan about the ultimate destination of the 
train, or about the passengers' assumptions about the directionality of 
human vision, or about their preconceptions about what will be found 
at the final station, suppose we first ask about what the passengers are 
doing with their baggage. How are they carrying it? How is it carrying 
them along? 
Our language, meanings and understandings, of course, constitute 
much of the freight. This is the sort of baggage that we can never leave 
behind and that carries us along. Indeed there is no movement of the 
sort Sheehan has been talking about apart from such baggage. Mary 
Gerhart and Allan Russell have drawn attention to an important mecha-
nism of that movement which they call the "metaphoric process."107 
Their understanding about what happens with such metaphoric mean-
ings suggests that there might be something Sheehan overlooks about 
how Aquinas and Rahner handle their baggage—about how, perhaps, 
even Heidegger and Sheehan carry theirs. 
Metaphoric Process 
Raising this question requires a brief overview of the Gerhart-
Russell theory.108 They imagine our inquiries about the world and 
107See Mary Gerhart and Allan Melvin Russell, Metaphoric Process: The Creation of 
Scientific and Religious Understanding (Fort Worth, TX: Texas Christian University 
Press, 1984); and New Maps for Old: Explorations in Science and Religion (New York: 
Continuum, 2001). 
108See also my "Refraining the Fields," Zygon 39/1 (March 2004): 49-62. 
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ourselves taking place in cognitive spaces or "worlds of meanings." 
These worlds of meanings are made up of networks of interrelated 
concepts, or "fields of meanings." The various sciences, religion, the-
ology, philosophy and the "common sense" of each epoch and culture 
are examples of such fields of meanings. The concepts within these 
fields do not stand directly for things themselves, but for our notions of 
these things. The notions are defined by their interrelation with other 
notions. For example, to get some conception of "house," one must 
have other notions available (lumber, bricks, wall, window, roof, and 
so forth). These other notions are variable, as well as the relations 
between them (not all houses are wood or brick, have four walls, etc.). 
So meaning as a social, cultural, and historical artifact "arises out of the 
interaction of concepts and relations, and is expressed in the topogra-
phy of the field."109 Gerhart and Russell are most interested in explain-
ing how new understandings and meanings develop among people 
who share such worlds of meanings. What they have to say on the 
matter is particularly relevant to our question about how conceptual 
baggage is carried and carries us along. 
They distinguish the discovery of new meanings from the acqui-
sition of new knowledge. The latter involves merely an addition of data 
and does not change the notions or fields of meanings themselves. For 
example, we can learn of new cities or new planets and so gain addi-
tional information for ourselves or the field of astronomy. In doing this, 
however, we usually do not change the notions of "city," "planet," or 
"solar system." In contrast, Copernicus' insistence that the sun is the 
center of the universe or Newton's insistence that the mechanical laws 
of the heavens are identical with the mechanical laws of the earth, 
created new understandings that changed fundamental notions within 
physics and indeed changed how ordinary people understood things. 
Much of the routine work of scientists, philosophers and theologians is 
devoted to the former sort of acquisition aimed at expanding the cur-
rent knowledge base. Insights of the latter sort are occurrences of genius 
and discovery typically associated with more extraordinary and con-
sequential developments in a field. 
So, to pursue our analogy, Gerhart and Russell's focus is not on the 
ways we cumulatively add to our baggage, or the ways we might switch 
or confuse different pieces of luggage. They are interested in the pro-
cedures that enable us to develop altogether new types of gear—gear 
that creates possibilities for different ways to travel and, with that, 
possibilities for new destinations. The process which they see fre-
quently acting as the mechanism for such movement entails "forcing" 
*New Maps for Old, 12. 
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an analogy between two meanings that, given current understandings, 
is unwarranted. In Copernicus' case, for example, the affirmation that 
"the sun is the center" conflicted with the standard account at the time 
that "the earth is the center." To affirm that the laws of heaven and the 
laws of earth are the same, as Newton did, also entailed forcing an 
affirmation which contradicted "meanings" taken for granted in the 
science of the day. But the effect of these forced affirmations, despite 
their apparent unreasonableness, was to open up possibilities for un-
derstanding which had not been available before. What most distin-
guishes such uncalled-for analogies is the disruptive effect on the fields 
of meaning associated with them. The force of the analogies did not 
simply add new information to the world of physics, expanding it the 
way the discovery of a new planet or a new mechanical law might have. 
Nor did it clarify the given world of meanings, the way affirming an apt 
analogy between something known and something unknown might 
have. In Newton's day, for example, Galileo's understanding of the 
heavens and Kepler's understanding of mechanics were already 
known. The uncalled-for analogies had a more "tectonic" effect be-
cause they forced a reconfiguration in the until-then accepted fields of 
meanings. The result was newly shaped fields of meanings that con-
stitute a better understanding of what we know of reality.110 In that 
sense, the result is a new world. Moreover, such shifts in fields of 
meanings typically makes available a new logic and understanding of 
what is reasonable. Conceptual moves are possible in Einstein's world 
that were inconceivable in Newton's. And moves in Newton's world 
would not have made sense in Galileo's. Each metaphoric move has the 
potential to lay the groundwork for later moves otherwise unthinkable. 
This creation of significant changes in fields of meanings is the 
fundamental characteristic of the process Gerhart and Russell call 
"metaphoric." That is what distinguishes it from rhetorical moves we 
more commonly label "analogy" or "metaphor," neither of which re-
shapes the very fields of meanings or logical relations between them. 
(In Gerhart and Russell's theory "metaphoric" and "metaphorical" are 
not equivalent. And on their accounting many metaphors are not genu-
inely metaphoric because they do not create the possibility for new 
meaning by creating fundamental shifts in our fields of meanings.) 
Sheehan's Thought-Experiment 
Gerhart and Russell examine examples of metaphoric acts in reli-
gion, as well as science. To introduce theological examples at this point 
might be tendentious, given my assertion, not yet fully explained, that 
L0Ibid., 41-42. 
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Sheehan's atheological analysis appears to miss the metaphoric dimen-
sion of Christian thought, speech and action. So, perhaps we could 
consider as illustrations his own proposed identification of God with 
the open-ended correlate of our socially co-open infinity, and the im-
plications: that humanity is about alêtheia, and that the original sin of 
Christianity is to think that it is about God. It is an interesting question 
whether this suggestion is philosophical, theological, or religious, but 
for our immediate purpose that does not have to be settled. Sheehan 
hedges his proposal by describing it as a thought-experiment. Never-
theless, the thrust of his analysis of Heidegger, Rahner and Jesus sug-
gests that Sheehan really means to affirm in a quite radical and serious 
way that humanity is about alêtheia. The aim of his affirmation and his 
rhetoric is to fundamentally alter the fields of meaning associated with 
the concepts of God, human transcendence, being, truth, mystery and 
Jesus—just as Heidegger aims to alter the fields of meaning associated 
with ontology. The questions are entirely transformed. Old assump-
tions and logic (onto-theo-logic, that is) no longer hold. A new world 
opens up. I believe this is what Sheehan means when he promises that 
entertaining his new paradigm for Heidegger research "would just be 
the beginning of the fun"111 or when he suggests that with his thought-
experiment the need for many standard theological distinctions would 
disappear. 
Three entailments of this sort of conceptual move are noteworthy. 
First, metaphoric moves make real, though logically and semantically 
altered, affirmations. Within the new context, moves that previously 
would have been regarded as merely symbolic or metaphorical (as op-
posed to metaphoric) may now function in a more "literal" way. I use 
"literal" here advisedly. The conception of metaphoric process desta-
bilizes the meaning of "literal" itself and warrants this qualified use. 
Although reference to the literal meaning often presupposes that exact 
and primary meanings are univocal and constant, and that fields of 
meanings are stable, the metaphoric process demonstrates that this is 
not always the case; meanings are dynamic. In a metaphoric affirmation 
words come to have new exact and primary meanings. Moreover, these 
meanings can be semantically proper, logically warranted, and factu-
ally the case—three further important denotations of "literal." So after 
Thompson and Joule, heat is motion. After Einstein, it is literally true 
that the speed of light is the same for all observers and this means "that 
moving clocks must run slow, that objects get short in their direction of 
motion, [and] that moving particles increase in mass... ."112 For Shee-
han, after Heidegger (and after what he considers the pre-philosophical 
l l l KA Paradigm Shift in Heidegger Research," 19. 
112New Maps for Old, 42. 
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roots of Aristotle in the archaic Greeks and the pre-theological roots of 
Aquinas in Jesus), humanity is literally about alëtheîa. Our "finitude 
does all the work. No more room for Big Being."113 Does that mean no 
more room for God? 
Second, reception is a crucial element in metaphoric acts. The new 
meanings, logical entailments, and insights are available only to those 
who are able and willing to accept the proposed changes in the fields 
of meanings. Getting the point of how the forced analogy stretches and 
alters the available fields of meanings is thus crucial to understanding 
the metaphoric act. It is always possible that one might not, as we say, 
"get the point." And there are a number of ways of not getting the point. 
Sheehan's affirmation, for example, could be taken as metaphoric, that 
is, as opening up a new world of meaning in which onto-theo-logic has 
been overcome. This is, in fact, what it appears to me he is doing. But 
no doubt some readers, like some readers of Heidegger's later works, 
will conclude that language here has gone on a holiday and not get his 
point at all. It is nonsense. Others might take Sheehan's hedging to 
indicate that he is speaking symbolically and metaphorically, and so 
they conclude: he is not literally denying God's existence. Some might 
miss the thrust of his critique of Rahner and conclude that Sheehan's 
hypothesis intends to line up analogical similarities-in-difference be-
tween Heideggers notion of alëtheîa and the believers notion of God to 
clarify one or the other of these notions. It is conceivable that someone 
might think naively that they could use Sheehans interpretation of 
Heideggers alëtheîa as an apologetic simile to help those who have not 
experienced God to learn what the term actually signifies. We have 
already investigated how a strong case could be made for reading Shee-
hans affirmation literally as a reduction of theology to anthropology 
akin to Feuerbach's. So, there are a number of alternatives that appear 
if we focus on what is done with the baggage rather than on what 
baggage is carried. One has to get the genre right and the logic right, to 
get the point. 
Third, recognizing a move as metaphoric does not prove it true. 
Nor is someone who makes such a move necessarily conscious of it as 
metaphoric. Case in point: although I am quite sure that there is some-
thing metaphoric going on in Sheehan's argument and rhetoric, I am 
not convinced he is correct. Nor could one conclude from his writings 
that he had any awareness that he was handling his baggage in a meta-
phoric way along the lines described by Gerhart and Russell. Still, if my 
hunch is right, something significant is gained by attending to the meta-
phoric thrust of Sheehan's argument and rhetoric. It then becomes ap-
'"A Paradigm Shift in Heidegger Research," 17. 
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parent how the clearing he seeks to open with the help of Heidegger is 
quite different from Feuerbach's position. Perhaps, then, it becomes 
understandable also why he saves "God" even though he proposes to 
move us to a world of meanings where such concepts would no longer 
have the old significance. The clearing is created precisely by the meta-
phoric stretching of such words and the related fields of meanings to 
uncover a new way of thinking and talking about our humanity and its 
meaning. In this new atheological world of meaning, the question of 
God—the question that hunts for philosophical traces of Aristotle's 
self-coincident absolute knower—never arises. Hence, in that new 
atheological world of meaning, Sheehan perhaps does not speak falsely 
when he protests that his analysis does not argue against God's exis-
tence. In this new world of meanings perhaps there is also a sense in 
which it can be said that our human open-endedness is the very gift of 
God's power. To many, the charge of disingenuous rhetoric would still 
seem to apply. But perhaps not necessarily. Sheehan acknowledges 
that the insights which prompt Aquinas and Rahner are ultimately 
grounded in the Christian faith's non-philosophical, non-metaphysical 
conviction that we are claimed by God. Perhaps Sheehan's atheological 
world does intend to leave room for meaningful talk about God's claim 
on us. But if he does, he does not appear to provide for a conceptuality 
to articulate and protect such talk. It is not clear that his analysis even 
leaves room for that. 
An Alternative Thought-Experiment 
What if as an alternative thought-experiment, we suppose that 
there was something metaphoric going on from the beginning with the 
WELy Rahner, Aquinas and Jesus were handling their linguistic baggage. 
Consider the case of Rahner. My thought-experiment would not require 
that he was consciously seeking to do something metaphoric, only that 
something quite new was coming to light as he brought together the 
different worlds of meanings with which he grappled as a believer, 
Jesuit priest, philosopher, and theologian. This does not necessitate 
that, from the start, he knew how to adequately articulate his insight or 
appreciated all its implications. On my supposition, what Sheehan 
portrays as a disjunction, Rahner to the contrary affirms as an identity. 
Is humanity about God? Or is humanity about alêtheia? Rahner an-
swers: both God and alêtheia. I use "God" here to indicate the complex 
of meanings which Rahner inherits from his faith (including Aquinas'). 
I take alêtheia to indicate the meanings Rahner aims to appropriate, 
although perhaps understands imperfectly, from Heidegger. 
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I agree with Sheehan that in identifying these, Rahner combines 
incommensurable meanings.114 So on this supposition, the early work 
such as Spirit in the World is neither proper metaphysics, as Rahner's 
mentor apparently concluded when he failed the dissertation, nor con-
sistent with Heidegger, as Sheehan alleges. With that premise, and the 
evidence that Rahner later came to a clearer appreciation of the differ-
ence between the metaphysical conception of God as ipsum esse and 
Heidegger's conception of his own problematic, there are grounds for 
concluding with Sheehan that Rahner's language falls short of his in-
sight. The problem with this supposition, however, is that Rahner con-
tinues to talk in ways that are quite inconsistent with Heidegger's per-
spective, indeed much more so than Sheehan lets on. Moreover, as 
Sheehan notes, Rahner seems not concerned about this at all. Sheehan 
has no explanation for this aside from the suggestion that these are the 
slips of a believer whose baggage prevents him from recognizing "when 
his philosophy edges beyond ousiology and when it falls back into 
it."115 
The other possibility is that in forcing the identification of mean-
ings that for metaphysicians and Heideggeriane are incommensurable, 
Rahner is stretching language and thought to create conceptual space to 
say something new. In identifying God as the holy mystery which 
claims us but always remains beyond our grasp, Rahner transforms 
both the Thomist and Heideggerian fields of meanings. His is not the 
Aristotelian, metaphysical conception of God. His is not merely a 
Heideggerian recessiveness which bespeaks nothing about a human 
114This entails agreement with Sheehan that there is little ground for hoping that one 
field of meanings can be explained in terms of the other in a manner which would be 
acceptable to both Thomists and Heideggeriane. No attempt to do so has been successful 
yet. And on both Sheehan's accounting and mine, although for very different reasons, 
there is no need for this. The strongest case against this claim is argued by William 
Kangas, "In the Proximity of Guilt and Danger: Karl Rahner As Heidegger's Other," 
Philosophy Today 44/3 (2000): 259-82. While Kangas* interpretation of Rahner and 
Heidegger is in large measure persuasive, he does not take adequately into account the 
metaphoric character of Rahner's moving "within the space which Heidegger's thinking 
opened up" (264). If one takes seriously the difference in questions from the very start, 
Rahners identification of the experience of God with Heideggers experience of alëtheia is 
a more fragile interpretive move than Kangas presumes. As a consequence, the infra-
structure and implications of the metaphysical field of meanings in Rahner's thought are 
more radically transformed, or at least put in question, than Kangas acknowledges. Kan-
gas is definitely right, however, in pointing to the difference in Rahner's and Heidegger's 
accounts of the experience of the "other" as crucial to understanding why Rahner finds 
warrant to hazard the identification of the experience of transcendence with the experi-
ence of God. A retrieval of Rahner for the contemporary context requires a more robust 
explanation of the metaphoric and fragile interpretive character of this move, and more 
comprehensive accounts of the experiences of intersubjectivity and ethical and religious 
responsibility in which it is rooted. For more on the latter see the reference to Fiorenza, 
note 120 below. 
115Karl Rahner, 313. 
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possibility for experiencing a claim of God that is more than, that is to 
say, not reducible to—the claim of finite transcendence. Rahner's meta-
phoric handling of the baggage he received from Aquinas and Heideg-
ger enables him to extort from both of them (both against their mean-
ings and in continuity with them) a recognition of our movement to-
wfirds a horizon that is always ahead of our grasp in order to uncover 
the "clearing" or "openness" within which it is possible to experience 
and discern that we are claimed by the mystery of God. In my thought-
experiment, what Rahner and Aquinas, along with much of the Chris-
tian tradition, have in common with Jesus, is that in continuity with 
him, they find the metaphoric resources to stretch language in ways 
which open such clearings and within them discover a claim of the 
holy mystery "whom" Christians call God. In his later works Rahner 
does not shrink from the implication that this move entails an appeal to 
faith experience which goes beyond philosophy as such. But it is a 
move that can be explained philosophically. A further role for philoso-
phy in "proving" such convictions becomes a moot issue with Rahner's 
arguments in the later works for an irreducible pluralism of philoso-
phies and a human nature which in fact has never existed in a pure 
state apart from God's initiative in grace. 
So I agree with Sheehan that Rahner brings metaphysics to the 
peint where its structure begins to come unglued. But where Sheehan 
seas a failure of nerve to go all the way with Heidegger, I see a meta-
phoric move that purposely goes in another direction. Where Sheehan 
sees Rahner's retrieval of Heidegger attempting illegitimately to ad-
vance an argument from phenomenology (or philosophy as such) for an 
awareness of God in our transcendence, I see Rahner forcing the avail-
able philosophical tools to a different task. He does indirectly appeal to 
Heidegger, but he does so to transform the field of meanings rather than 
press forward along the same track. Where Sheehan sees Rahner un-
doing Aquinas's metaphysical conception of God but unable to aban-
don Aquinas's ousiological language, I see Rahner retrieving Aquinas' 
own metaphoric moves and in this performance disclosing a way to 
think and speak of God that is fundamentally different than the meta-
physical thinking and speaking of Thomists who, like Heidegger and 
Sheehan, miss Aquinas's metaphoric thrust or who try to capture it in 
ousiological language inadequate to the task. The pretext in Spirít in 
the World and Hearer of the Word of regrounding a metaphysical basis 
for theology fades away as the implications of the metaphoric moves in 
those early reflections are worked out in subsequent theological inves-
tigations. One sees this in Rahner's essays on: the relationship between 
nature and grace, the concept of mystery, the role of philosophizing in 
theology, the irreducible pluralism of philosophy and intellectual 
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frameworks, and the historicity of philosophy and theology. On this 
supposition, Rahner's theological essays become explorations of this 
metaphoric move rather than a reduction of statements about God to 
statements about humanity, as Sheehan suggests without much con-
vincing textual warrant. 
My thought-experiment also shares Sheehan's judgment that the 
underlying and most important thrust of Rahner's retrieval of Aquinas 
and Heidegger was neither completely explicit nor consistently ex-
ecuted. But where Sheehan sees the inherited Thomistic language un-
dermining Rahner's best insights, I think the language hindered pri-
marily his explanation of what he was doing. There is no question that 
Rahner is aware of the novel conceptual moves he makes, but the meta-
phoric and tectonic character of his performance is hidden since he 
explains the moves themselves and the difference between the logic of 
discourse about God and about everything else by appealing to notions 
that can also be interpreted in purely ousiological categories: namely, 
analogy and the distinction between categorical and transcendental 
knowing. Attentiveness to the metaphoric character of his perfor-
mance, sheds new light on such explanations.116 It also clarifies why 
Rahner never elaborated Sheehan's theory about the devolution of 
Christian faith into theology. The need to postulate a devolution fol-
lows only if the metaphoric character of language and thought about 
God is missed. 
What if Aquinas' moves, likewise, can be described as metaphoric? 
David Burrell and Robert Sokolowski have offered good reasons to 
think this is appropriate.117 What if such metaphoric moves can be 
traced back to Jesus himself? What if Peter's resurrection experience 
was a response to the metaphoric character of what Jesus taught and 
did? James Alison makes an intriguing case for this in Raising Abel, 
though admittedly not on historical grounds that would be acceptable 
in the Jesus Seminar.118 This is not the place to argue so broad a case. 
116For further analysis of the metaphoric character of Rahner's thought see my "Anal-
ogy and Metaphoric Process," Theological Studies 62/3 (2001): 571-96; and "The Clash of 
Christological Symbols: A Case for Metaphoric Realism," in Chrístology: Memory, In-
quiry, Practice, ed. Anne M. Clifford and Anthony Godzieba (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 
2002), 62-86. 
117For an overview of the metaphoric thrust of Burrell's theory of analogy see my 
"Analogy and Metaphoric Process." Sokolowski's analysis of the logical entailments of 
what he calls the "Christian distinction" in effect is an effort to map the shifts in fields 
of meanings forced by the metaphoric affirmation of God as creator. See his The God of 
Faith & Reason: Foundations of Chrístian Theology (Washington, DC: Catholic Univer-
sity of America Press, 1982) and Eucharist Presence: A Study in the Theology of Disclo-
sure (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1994). 
118James Alison, Raising Abel: The Recovery of the Eschatological Imagination (New 
York: Crossroad, 1996). It is an interesting question whether the hypothesis of a meta-
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My point is merely to suggest why attention to the way that baggage is 
earned and carries us along might incline some of us to look on the 
platforms for another track than Sheehan's, Feuerbach's or the T. S. 
Eliot Express. 
This also provides sufficient indication of why in hope I think it 
likely that we will find Rahner, Aquinas and many other Christians on 
this alternative track expecting to follow Jesus' lead and not abandon-
ing talk of God. An adequate explanation of the metaphoric character of 
tins alternative line and of its deeper pre-philosophical and pre-
theological roots still needs to be written. People on this train will be 
on the lookout, no doubt, for someone who can articulate the character 
of the metaphoric route more clearly for the current generation, the way 
Rahner and Aquinas did in their day. Moreover, these passengers will 
trace their track back to experiences of community and social respon-
sibility shaped by metaphoric and religious sensibilities, not to the 
archaic Greeks or to Jesus as conceived by Sheehan. So they will be on 
the lookout, too, for a more nuanced and contemporary account of the 
fragile interpretive moves which lead them to hazard their identifica-
tion of alëtheia and God.119 Passengers on this line no doubt will share 
Sheehans reservations about articulations of the Christian faith that 
appear to know too much. But they also will pay more careful attention 
to how people carry their linguistic baggage and to how it carries them 
along. Like Sheehan they will recognize that we do not have a concep-
tual lock on God at the end of the line. But they will appreciate that 
some tracks go off in more helpful directions than others. If there is an 
original sin for people on this train, it is not to think that humanity is 
about God. Nor is it to think humanity is about alëtheia; on this train 
there is room for all people of good will. If there is a fault from which 
we must be saved, it is failure to be attentive enough to the openings 
that sometimes can be cleared when language and thought are stretched 
to new uses in response to the wonder of humanity and the mystery 
which claims us—no matter what name is given the mystery. 
phoric thrust could also be affirmed in the parables and sayings of Jesus as reconstructed 
by the Jesus Seminar. 
119Although Sheehan's focus on "being" and "otherness" gestures at two important 
indicators of the meaning of transcendence, Francis Schüssler Fiorenza more helpfully 
locates its meaning as a fragile interpretive implication of the experience of intersubjec-
tivity and ethical religious responsibility; that is the site where we will find the pre-
philosophical and pre-theological roots of the deeper claim to which Christian theology 
responds. See Francis Schüssler Fiorenza, "Being, Subjectivity, Otherness: The Idols of 
God," in Questioning God, ed. John D. Caputo, Mark Dooley, and Michael J. Scanlon 
(Bl oomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 341-69. 
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